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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid 
Laffan since September 2013, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). 
 
The Global Governance Programme at the EUI 
The Global Governance Programme (GGP) is research turned into action. It provides a European 
setting to conduct research at the highest level and promote synergies between the worlds of research 
and policy-making, to generate ideas and identify creative and innovative solutions to global 
challenges. 
The GGP comprises three core dimensions: research, policy and training. Diverse global governance 
issues are investigated in research strands and projects coordinated by senior scholars, both from the 
EUI and from other internationally recognized top institutions. The policy dimension is developed 
throughout the programme, but is highlighted in the GGP High-Level Policy Seminars, which bring 
together policy-makers and academics at the highest level to discuss issues of current global 
importance.The Academy of Global Governance (AGG) is a unique executive training programme 
where theory and “real world” experience meet. Young executives, policy makers, diplomats, 
officials, private sector professionals and junior academics, have the opportunity to meet, share views 
and debate with leading academics, top-level officials, heads of international organisations and senior 
executives, on topical issues relating to governance. 
 







The development of more sophisticated corruption measures has been stimulated by consistent and 
compelling demands for more effective action against corruption. However, the production of these 
indicators has rarely been addressed as a ‘technique of governance’ (Davis et al., 2012), or an 
instrument of ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). The first section (1) 
reviews the major existing measures of corruption, by focusing on different categories of indices and 
indicators. The second part (2) pays particular attention to the major ontological and methodological 
criticisms, constraints and pitfalls, connected with these indicators. The third part (3) presents a 
comparative analysis of two of the most widely used indicators of corruption: the World Bank’s 
Control of Corruption indicator (CC) and Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI). The fourth section (4) evaluates the policy implications embedded in the construction and 
employment of indicators, while the last part of the paper (5) concludes by summarizing the most 
important questions raised by this analysis. 
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Since 1975, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) has addressed the need to create 
international legislation against corruption in transnational commercial transactions; but beyond the 
production of reports, conventions and recommendations, few efforts have been made to harmonize 
legislative measures and anti-corruption policies. It is only during the 1990s that a substantial change 
has occurred: with the end of the Cold War, Western countries, international institutions and 
development agencies elaborated a new governance agenda in relation to the many states transitioning 
from socialist economies to capitalist ones. Within Western Europe, corruption scandals involving 
politicians and governing parties in Italy, France, Spain and Germany placed the issue on the agenda. 
International institutions promoted the restraining of state action and corruption, and the establishment 
of ‘a stable and transparent regulatory environment for private sector activity’ (International Monetary 
Fund, 1997).  
Ambitious anti-corruption strategies have been accompanied by a proliferation of corruption 
measures, oriented towards monitoring states’ compliance with anti-corruption policies. In the mid-
1990s, Transparency International (1995) and the World Bank (1996) provided some of the first 
measures of corruption. In 1997, the OECD has promoted one of the most comprehensive legislative 
instruments to criminalize transnational bribery (the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Officials in International Business Transactions). Also within the European anti-corruption policy 
developed by the Council of Europe, the production of indicators was considered essential for the 
elaboration of further anti-corruption policies: in 1995, the European Ministers of Justice proposed the 
formation of a multidisciplinary group on corruption that, in 1995, planned to undertake both a study 
and a convention for fighting corruption. And in 1999 the Committee of Ministers authorized the 
establishment of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), a European monitoring mechanism 
oriented to evaluate the level of corruption in each member state.  
Although consistent and compelling demands for more effective action against corruption has 
stimulated the formulation of more sophisticated measures of corruption, this activity has rarely been 
analyzed as a ‘technique of governance’ (Davis et al., 2012), or an instrument of ‘governance without 
government’ (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). Neither the historical evolution of these instruments has 
ever been systematically considered. In particular, a number of important questions have not received 
satisfactory answers: how do the indicators impact on decision- and policy-making? To what extent 
does the way in which we perceive corruption influence the manner in which the indicators are 
constructed? What normative and policy judgments are embedded in the construction of indicators?  
This background paper begins with the basic observation that during the last three decades, 
indicators of corruption have exerted some degree of influence on actors’ behavior in the production 
and implementation of anti-corruption strategies. However the literature has approached corruption 
indicators from a unilateral perspective: in particular, the discourse about indicators has been narrowed 
to a technical problem about how to quantify a real or perceived degree of corruption. The aim of this 
paper is to provide a background but also integrated analysis about the discourse, the production and 
the use of indicators.  
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section (1) reviews the major existing measures of 
corruption, by focusing on different categories of indices and indicators. The second part (2) pays 
particular attention to the major ontological and methodological criticisms, constraints and pitfalls, 
connected with these indicators. The third part (3) presents a comparative analysis of two of the most 
widely used indicators of corruption: the World Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator (CC) and 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The fourth section (4) evaluates the 




policy implication embedded in the construction and employment of indicators, while the last part of 
the paper (5) concludes by summarizing the most important insights from this analysis. 
1. Literature review 
During the last three decades there has been an explosion of interest in the construction and 
employment of governance indicators: as reported by Arndt and Oman ‘there are now some 140 user-
accessible sets of governance indicators, comprising literally thousands of individual indicators’ 
(Arndt & Oman, 2006). While the production of corruption indicators has been subject to normative 
and methodological changes, scholars have rarely addressed the historical evolution of this production. 
Rather than taking for granted the constructive and historical dimension of producing indicators, this 
section considers how different types of corruption indicators have been created. In order to orient 
ourselves within this ‘jungle of governance indicators’ (ibidem), three orders of measures have been 
summarized in Table 1, which include: survey-based measures of corruption (I), indicators of 
corruption provided by indices of (global) governance (II), and indicators of corruption provided by 
indices of state capacity (III). 
The first group, composed of survey-based measures of corruption (I), emerged in the mid-1990s 
when the first demands for effective anti-corruption policies encouraged the formulation of ad hoc, 
specific, measures of corruption, budget transparency and accountability indices or commercial 
surveys. These include: the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the Bribery Perception Index (BPI) 
and Bribe Payers Index, published by Transparency International; the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) performed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) & the World Bank (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006); the Corruption 
Experience Index and the Business International Index, issued by Business International; the Open 
Budget Survey issued by the International Budget Partnership and Voices of the People Survey 
developed by Gallup International. 
  




Table 1. Measures of corruption: indices and indicators (providers in alphabetical order) 




European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) & World Bank 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS); 
Gallup International Voice of the People Survey (VOPS); 
Global Business Media Limited Business International Index; 
Corruption Experience Index 
International Budget Partnership Open Budget Survey 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
Transparency International & Gallup 
International 
Bribery perception index (BPI); 




European Commission Eurobarometer 
EU ICS Research Consortium International Crime Victimization Surveys (ICVS) 
European Values Study European Values Study 
Freedom House Nation in Transit (NIT) 
Global Integrity & Mo ‘Ibrahim 
foundation 
Africa Integrity Indicators; 
Index of African Governance; 
The Corruption Notebooks; 
Global Integrity Index 
HIS Global Insight Global Insight 
Institute for Management 
Development (IMD) 
The Global Competitiveness Report (GRC) 
Latinobarometro Corporation Latinobarometer 
Michigan State University Afrobarometer 
The Political Risk Service Group The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
UNECA Africa Governance Indicator (AGI)  
World Bank World Governance Indicators (WGI); 
WB Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey; 
World Competitiveness Yearbook; 
Global Competitiveness Report (GRC). 




Brooking institute  Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 
Brooking institute, the Institute for 
State Effectiveness, the Institute for 
State Effectiveness, and the Australian 
National University  
Sovereignty Index 
Canadian International Development 
Agency 
Country Indicators for foreign policy project 
Centre for Global Policy, George 
Mason University  
Political Instability Task Force 
Center for Systemic Peace and Center 
for Global Policy at George Mason 
University  
State Fragility Index 
Columbia University State Capacity Survey 
Fund for Peace, Foreign Policy  Failed States Index 
World Bank LICUS 
In parallel, in the mid-1990s a second group (II) was created, comprehending indicators calculated by 
indices of governance in which corruption usually constitutes one of the key dimensions for estimating 
broader levels of governance. This group includes: the World Bank Governance Indicators Database 
(WGI); the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); the Global Competitiveness Report (GRC); the 




Executive Opinion Survey; the World Competitiveness Yearbook; the Global Competitiveness Report 
(GRC), the Nations in Transit (NIT), the World Value Survey (WVS); the International Crime 
Victimization Surveys (ICVS); the Global Integrity; Global Insight and the WB Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA). This second group includes also regional measures of corruption 
such as the Eurobarometer, the European Values Study, the Asiabarometer, the Latinobarometer, the 
Africa Governance Indicator (AGI), the African Integrity Indicator, the Afrobarometer and the Index 
of African Governance.  
A third group of corruption indicators has been provided by state-capacity indices (III) oriented to 
estimate the countries’ performance in a set of spheres considered to be critical for safeguarding the 
integrity of government responsibilities. These indicators have proliferated since the 2000s, when the 
discourse about state capacity has gathered major attention inside the debate about governance. 
Indicators of corruption within state-capacity indexes include, at least: the State Capacity Survey 
developed by Columbia University; the State Fragility Index published by the Center for Systemic 
Peace and Center for Global Policy at George Mason University (Goldstone et al., 2010); the 
Sovereignty Index elaborated by the joint-venture between the Brookings Institution, the Institute for 
State Effectiveness, the Institute for State Effectiveness, and the Australian National University 
(Ghani, Lockhart, & Carnahan, 2005); the Country Indicators for foreign policy project delivered by 
the Canadian International Development Agency (Carment, Achkar, & Prest, 2006; The World Bank, 
1997); the Political Instability Task Force launched by the Centre for Global Policy at George Mason 
University (Goldstone et al., 2010), the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World published by 
the Brooking institute (Rice and Patrick, 2008); the Failed States Index produced by the Fund for 
Peace and published by Foreign Policy (Haken et al., 2012) and the list of LICUS countries (Chase, 
2002), generated by the World Bank. 
The first generation of corruption indicators illustrated in Table 1 has been subject to several 
pitfalls that caused scholars and policy-makers to reconsider key methodological and theoretical 
aspects. As result, new approaches are emerging to formulate more specific and disaggregated 
indicators of corruption: the so-called second generation of good governance indicators, includes, for 
instance, new measures of corruption that, departing from a different conceptualization of corruption 
as a ‘state of default equilibrium’, are able to design instruments with a better diagnostic purpose 
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011). A new tendency has also arisen oriented to complement broader measures 
with specific and in-depth country-studies able of capturing corruption within a specific territorial 
context, and therefore of formulating specific and ‘evidence-based’ requests of intervention 
(Heidenheimer, Johnston, & LeVine, 2009). This new generation of studies, born within the third 
generation of quantitative studies comprehends: The Corruption Notebook issued by Global Integrity 
since 2007, The Global Corruption Report (GCR) launched by TI in 2001, national and transnational 
reported inaugurated by national and transnational institutions, such as the EU Anti-Corruption Report 
that will be published by the European Commission in 2014. This new set of studies may not be 
considered an integral part of indicators or indices of corruption since it is composed by case-studies 
and country-analyses. But it must be considered an important methodological reorientation within the 
use and abuse of governance indicators (Arndt & Oman, 2006). 
Among the categories of corruption measures above illustrated, two methodological orientations 
have emerged (Sampford, 2006; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006). On the one side, there are 
indices of corruption based on subjective data, where experience based instruments are devoted to 
survey peoples’ (Gallup International) or experts’ (CPI and WGI) perception of corruption in the 
public or private sector (Lambsdorff, 2006). Transparency International inaugurated this approach in 
the mid 1990s, when the idea of building a composite index was advanced with the aim of providing 
data on the extensive perceptions of corruption within countries (Lambsdorff, 2006). Other cases of 
corruption indices based on subjective data include both the International Social Survey Program and 
the Gallup World Poll that accounts for the populations’ perception of corruption in their own 




government. The subjective approach was further consolidated when the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) included the ‘Control of Corruption’ within one of the six
1
 ‘dimensions’ best 
capturing the concept of Global Governance.  
On the other hand, there are measures of corruption based on objective data, where the level of 
corruption is computed through data related to judicial prosecution of crimes concerning the abuse of 
public office (Goel & Nelson, 2005). Some measures have taken into consideration the differences 
between the amounts of physically existing public infrastructure (Golden & Picci, 2005), and the 
amounts of money cumulatively allocated by government to create public works (ibidem). Other 
objective data have been provided by tracking countries’ institutional features (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2006), by gathering views of stakeholders involved in criminal prosecutions of corruption 
(ibidem), or simply by audits of specific projects (ibidem). Within coding and ranking activities, a set 
of hybrid measures have been created with the aim of interpolating subjective perception with 
objective data: the ICRG, for instance, is one of the important hybrid measures, which relies on 
perception data for its political-risk assessment and entirely on objective data for its economic-risk 
assessment (Arndt & Oman, 2006). Hybrid measures include also the World Competitiveness 
Yearbook and the Transition Report, issued by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
2. Constraints, challenges and critiques 
Although the proliferation of corruption indicators has stimulated an increasing sophistication in both 
data collection and management, during the last decade, researchers have raised significant criticisms. 
Two orders of critiques must be taken into account: first, there are ontological considerations (2.1), 
concerning the manner in which corruption has been defined and conceptualized. And secondly, there 
are a series of methodological concerns (2.2) about the processes and techniques of quantification. 
2.1 Ontological critiques 
2.1.1 Polyarchy of definitions 
First, a fundamental critique concerns the way in which researchers have defined corruption: although 
the term ‘corruption’ usually refers to an improper use of power by public officials or public servants 
in order to obtain personal benefits, different and divergent definitions have emerged during the last 
decades (Andvig, Amundsen, & Søreide, 2000; Huberts, Lasthuizen, & Peeters, 2006; Sampford, 
2006) fostering a non-comprehensive framework of analysis. Table 2 illustrates the strident polyarchy 
of concepts emerging from a comparative analysis between some of the most important measures of 
corruption. The fundamental disagreement between indicator providers concerns the definition of the 
harm entailed in corruption: the World Bank (WB) defines corruption ‘the abuse of public office for 
private gain’ (Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGI, 2013); Transparency International (TI) refers 
indeed to the ‘the abuse of entrusted power’ (Transparency International, 2013), while the UN has 
simplified the differences referring only to ‘the abuse of power for private gain’ (UN, 2004). As 
consequence, the main difference concerns the typology of sector, public or private, harmed by 
corruption. The definition provided by TI and Lambsdorff refers to ‘the measure of public power for 
private benefit …that related to receiving money or valuable assets, but it may also encompass 
increases in power or status’ (Lambsdorff, 2007). For the WB, corruption includes ‘both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as the ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests’ 
(Worldwide Governance Indicators, WGI, 2013).  
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 Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, 
Rule of Law, Control of Corruption. 




An ambiguity emerges vis-à-vis from the relationship between corruption and bribery: while the 
OECD adopts a definition that embraces both ‘active or passive bribery’ (OECD, 2008), TI 
conceptualizes the ‘active bribery’, as a separate form of corruption. The same discrepancies have 
emerged between the European institutions and organizations: the European Commission and the 
Council of Europe adopt the UN’s definition that conceptualizes corruption as the ‘abuse of power for 
private gain’ (European Commission, 2003); the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Council of 
Europe, 1999a) defines the active bribery of domestic public official (art. 2) as sharply distinguished 
from passive bribery (art. 3). For the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Council of Europe, 1999b) 
corruption means ‘requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other 
undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or behavior 
required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof’ (Council of Europe, 
1999a). 
What can explain this heterogeneity? According to Rohwer ‘because there are so many different 
forms of corruption, it is not possible for one indicator to capture the multidimensional aspect of 
corruption in a reliable and objective manner’ (2009: 43). However, the multidimensional character of 
corruption is not alone sufficient to explain the existing definitional polyarchy; so, other factors 
informing this conceptual ambiguity must be taken into consideration as well.  
  




Table 2. Definitions of corruption 
  Definitions 







Corruption ‘Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It hurts 
everyone who depends on the integrity of people in a position of 
authority’ (TI, 2013). 
Bribery ‘The client acts as a briber and makes a payment (also called kickback, 
baksheesh, sweetener, pay-off, speed- or grease-money) to the agent, 
who then is called a bribee. In return the client obtains an advantage 
such as a service or license he is not entitled to obtain, for example a 
tax rebate or a public contract’ (Lambsdorff, 2007:19). 
Extortion The agent ‘extracts money or benefit from the client’ for obtaining a 
public service’ (Lambsdorff, 2007:19). 
Embezzlement ‘Theft of public resources from the agent’ (Lambsdorff, 2007:19). 
Fraud ‘The agent can also actively conceal information from the principal 
with the help of trickery, swindle, deceit, manipulation or distortion of 
information, facts and expertise’ (Lambsdorff, 2007:19). 
UN (2004) Grand ‘Grand Corruption is an expression used to describe corruption that 
‘pervades the highest levels of government, engendering major abuses 
of power’ (United Nations, 2004:23). 
Petty ‘Petty corruption, sometimes described as “administrative corruption”, 
involves the exchange of very small amounts of money, and the 
granting of small favours. These, however, can carry considerable 
public losses, as with the customs officer who waves through a 
consignment of high-duty goods having been bribed a mere $50 or so’ 
(United Nations, 2004: 23).  
Bribery ‘Bribery is the act of conferring a benefit in order improperly to 
influence an action or decision’ (United Nations, 2004: 24). 
WB Corruption ‘…The extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests’ (WGI, 2013). 
OECD (2008) Corruption The Active corruption or ‘active bribery’ is defined as paying or 
promising to pay a bribe (OECD, 2008). The ‘active or passive misuse of 
the powers of Public officials (appointed or elected) for private 
financial or other benefits’ (ibidem). 
European 
Commission 




174) art. 2 
Corruption ‘Requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe 
or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the 
proper performance of any duty or behavior required of the recipient 




Corruption art. 15 
Active bribe ‘The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or 
indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or 
another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from 
acting in the exercise of his or her official duties’ (Council of Europe, 
1999a).  
Passive bribe ‘The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, 
of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another 
person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in 
the exercise of his or her official duties’ (Council of Europe, 1999a).  




2.1.2 Lack of clear distinction between corruption and state capacity 
On one side, the relationship between the concept of corruption and the categories of state fragility is 
controversial. During the 1990s many researchers have tended to interpret corruption as the 
phenomena originating in deviant forms of political authority (clientelism, vampire states, 
patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism). With the aftermath of the failed state debate, researchers 
began to approach corruption no longer as a dependent variable, but as one of the factors affecting 
state stability and potentially generating or deteriorating political crises. Within the corruption 
literature, for instance, patrimonialism and clientelism have been largely perceived as forms of 
corruption taking place in different situations of active bribery. However, many scholars in the 1980s 
had conceptualized patrimonialism as an entire social order, where the political-administrative 
authority is converted into a private patrimony by a bureaucracy and hegemonic party’ (Medard, 1979: 
39). Whereas the terms patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism have been employed to describe the 
‘state’s lack of institutionalization and ‘underdevelopment’ (Bach & Gazibo, 2012) the corruption 
literature, has tended to interpret (neo)-patrimonialism as a simple sub-category of corruption. The 
interaction between state capacity and anti-corruption debates has not been harmonized and this 
interaction has raised a set of still unanswered questions: what is the difference between corruption 
and its major components? What kind of relationship exists between a client or patrimonialized state 
and corruption? Does corruption represent a determinant or an attribute of state fragility?  
2.1.3 Economic or political components? 
On the other side, the transition from the corruption-centered debate of the early 1990s to the state-
capacity approach of the early 2000s, has marked a fundamental epistemological change within the 
theories of political development. At the same time, the tendency to overlook the differences between 
these two approaches creates major confusion. An important source of misunderstanding arises from 
the question of whether corruption must be operationalized either as an economic or as a political 
indicator. While the indices of corruption have attempted to privilege the economic rationale for 
measuring and repressing corruption, the state fragility indices have employed indicators of corruption 
to construct political rather economic indicators. In the case of the Index of State Weakness, corruption 
has been employed as a component
2
 of the political indicators which assess ‘the quality of a state’s 
political institutions and the extent to which its citizens accept as legitimate their system of 
governance’(Rice and Patrick, 2008: 8). Also the Failed States Index, issued by the Fund for Peace, 
includes corruption within its components of political indicators. 
2.1.4 Technical or conceptual incongruence? 
Another important critique concerns the tendency to approach this definitional discontinuity as a pure 
technical problem, when the conceptual incongruence actually derives from differing approaches to 
the normative issue lying at the core of this debate. What does corruption hurt? Taking into 
consideration one of the most influential definitions, provided by Lambsdorff, corruption represents 
the measure of public power for private benefit (Lambsdorff, 2007 17). But what does exactly ‘the 
extent of corruption’ imply? Wondering whether corruption must be related to formal obligations or 
public expectations, Lambsdorff finally moves up the ladder, anchoring corruption in the concept of 
public interest. Corruption hurts the satisfaction of the public interest and the realization of a set of 
economic, social and political conditions enabling good governance. Many other scholars have 
interpreted corruption as a deviation from the ‘legal-rational model’ of stateness (Andvig et al., 2000) 
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 The other components concerns: government accountability to citizens, rule of law, the extent of democratization, 
freedom of expression and association, and the ability of the state bureaucracy and institutions to function effectively, 
independently, and responsively. 




and many others have had no doubt in identifying corruption as an attribute of bad governance. 
However, the concept of corruption, inevitably, invokes two normative starting-points, good 
governance and public interest, usually taken for granted within this debate. What actually constitutes 
the public interest? Which are the standards establishing good or bad governance? The concept of state 
embedded within the measures of corruption has been strongly influenced by Weber’s ideal type of 
rational-legal-bureaucracy (ibidem). But the post-Weberian tendency to turn an ideal type into a 
typology of governance, has induced researchers and policy-makers to crystallize a model of 
governance that does not exist anywhere in pure form. A concept of corruption that rests on this 
typology implies a coherent and uniform image of state, following a linear pattern of political (and 
economic) development: deviance from this pattern is too readily interpreted as necessarily indicative 
of defective governance and corrupt practices. Quantification and measurement tends to accentuate 
this problem. By attributing to the ideal-types a standardized value, each variation from the central 
value can be interpreted as evidence of bad performance which transforms the indicators into judges, 
rather than monitors, of the contemporary political order. 
2.2 Methodological critiques 
Beyond the formulation of important ontological critiques, scholars have sharply criticized the 
methodology employed in the construction of the indicators (Treisman, 2007; You & Khagram, 2005; 
Apaza, 2009; Lambsdorff, 2007) . Particular emphasis has been devoted to evaluate three issues: 
biases in subjective data (2.3.1); risks related to the technique of aggregating multiple data (2.3.2); and 
data gathering as well as missing data (2.3.3).  
2.2.1 Subjective data  
A first critique has been formulated with regard to the use of opinions and perceptions for constructing 
indices of corruption: many scholars have pointed out that the perceived value of corruption omits the 
‘absolute amount of corruption’ (Galtung, 1998), while for others perception indices are too much 
dependent on the perspectives of specific groups of business elite or experts (Andvig et al., 2000). The 
Control of Corruption provided by the WB, for instance, has been criticized for being biased from the 
perspective of business elites, which evaluate corruption on the basis of their own political orientation 
(Rohwer, 2009). Also the CPI has been criticized for its at least questionable assumption (Arndt & 




While some scholars have raised ‘objective criticisms’ according to which the experts’ judgment 
may be fundamentally imprecise and biased (You & Khagram, 2005), others have addressed 
‘ontological criticisms’, supporting the notion that the quantification of subjective judgments 
inappropriately transform personal judgments into impersonal measures. According to Treisman 
(2007: 13), ‘it could also be that the widely used subjective indexes are capturing not observations of 
the frequency of corruption but inferences made by experts and survey respondents on the basis of 
conventional understandings of corruption’s cause’. 
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 According to Søreide: ‘It is not clear to what extent the level of corruption reflects the frequency of corrupt acts, the 
damage done to society or the size of the bribes. The polls and surveys behind the CPI ask different questions related to 
corruption, and do not cover precisely the same issue. Some sources aim at political corruption, while others ask about 
lower- level bureaucratic corruption. Most of the polls and surveys ask for a general opinion on the magnitude of the 
problem (“how widespread” is the problem), usually not the respondents’ personal experiences, which basically means 
that they ask for people's subjective intuition of the extent of something unobservable. Given the discussion in the 
previous section, it is even unclear what this unobservable phenomenon is’ (Søreide, 2006: 26). 




2.2.2 Composite Indicators 
A second criticism concerns the choice of creating composite indicators and therefore the reliance on 
the aggregation of different data sources. Both of the most important measures of corruption, result 
from an aggregation methodology: the Control of Corruption indicator, issued by the World Bank is 
composed of 21 different assessments and surveys, while the CPI, released by Transparency 
International, is calculated using 17 data sources. Several scholars have observed that even if 
composite indicators present some strength in summarizing information, they run the risk of losing 
conceptual clarity (Van Dijk & Van Mierlo, 2011), because the indices may depend on sources that are 
not publicly available (Knack & Keefer, 1995), or on obscure methodologies. Aggregate indicators 
may also run the risk of creating conceptual ambiguity
4
 between the various aspects of corruption 
incorporated in the common measure (Søreide, 2006). Another consistent risk concerns the loss of 
internal validity triggered by the impossibility of guaranteeing the independence of various sources: 
the aggregation of multiple data sources, in fact, may also include data that rely on the same sources 
for the construction of their own measures. As result, the aggregation may not be based on 
independent judgments, bias that seriously compromising the ‘conceptual precision’ (Knack, 2006) of 
the composite indicator. 
2.2.3 Data gathering and missing data 
A third problem concerns data gathering and missing data: many scholars have expressed perplexity 
about the transparency in collecting information (Rohwer, 2009; Arndt & Oman, 2006), especially 
when missing data creates the necessity of devising alternative ways to collect information. For 
instance, missing data for some indicators may induce researchers to derive information from other 
sources without considering whether the information can be adequately aggregated with other indices.  
As noted by Knack, the weight given to various sources can change over time, but given the 
absence of information, the aggregate indicator may present asymmetries that reduce the validity of 
the aggregate indicator, especially as a measure for making comparisons over years and across 
countries. This concern is particularly true for surveys like the ICRG, the World Economic Forum’s 
Executive Opinion Survey (ibidem), the Control of Corruption and CPI. 
3. A comparison between the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Control of 
Corruption (CC/WGI) 
This section focuses on two of the most widely used indicators of corruption: the World Bank’s 
Control of Corruption indicator (CC) and the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI). Based on the interpolation of several surveys and polls related to the perception of 
corruption experienced both by experts and business people, these measures share the common 
assumption according to which the aggregation of independent sources can increase the reliability of 
the measures of corruption. However, important discontinuities emerge between them. The aim of this 
section is to present a comparative analysis of these instruments aiming to better defining the 
conceptual and methodological challenges related to the activity of building corruption indicators. 
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3.1 Operationalization and methodological concerns 
Although both TI and WB converge on the general idea of creating better data for better governance 
by privileging the creation of a composite index, the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index (CC) 
and the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) present important conceptual 
and methodological differences.  
3.1.1 Purposes 
The first important difference concerns the original purposes moving the two organizations to 
elaborate measures of corruption. The CPI is an ad-hoc measure of corruption aiming to ‘provide data 
on extensive perceptions of corruption within countries’ (Lambsdorff, 2007) while the Control of 
Corruption is one of the six indicators necessary to assess a measure of governance originally devoted 
to create cross-country indicators of governance. The aim of the CPI is raising the public awareness of 
corruption not only in order to press governments to care about corruption, but also helping civil 
society to ‘demand accountability from their leaders’ (Transparency International, 2012). The aim of 
the WGI is to create instruments useful to establish more effective instruments of government 
assistance (The World Bank, 2007).  
3.1.2 Conceptualization and data gathering 
Since the aim of these two measures differs, the way in which corruption has been conceptualized also 
presents important dissimilarities: while the CPI defines corruption as a general ‘abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain’ (TI, 2013), for the World Bank corruption captures ‘both petty and grand 
forms of corruption’, even inside the private sector (Kaufmann, Hellman, Jones, & Schankerman, 
2000).  
Differences exist also between the strategies of data collection: in the 2012 edition of the CPI 
surveys are collected from 13 organizations, while the CC is based on the aggregation of 31 different 
surveys. CPI data includes both the perception of resident and non-resident panels of experts drawn 
from NGOs
5
 and business executives, with respect to the performance of foreign and home countries
6
. 
CC data includes, indeed, 31 sources provided by surveys of firms and households
7





, and public sector organizations
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.  
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The different criteria adopted for collecting data have implied another difference in respect of the 
representativeness of these indices. The choice made by the WB to rely on a larger set of data, in fact, 
provides for the possibility of covering a large number of countries: at the beginning, in 1996, the CPI 
was calculated for 54 countries while the CC was calculated for 204 countries; while the 2012 CPI has 
been calculated for 176 countries and the 2012 CC for 212. However, according to Lambsdorff (2007), 
the WB decision to adopt ‘problematic’ data sources, has reduced the validity of the indicator: as 
claimed by Lambsdorff, Global Insight (Standard and Poors/DRI) and the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), for instance, assess the potential political risk of corruption in the country, while the 
Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) adopts an ‘untidy’ definition of corruption, because 
one of the causal criteria adopted to compute corruption is called ‘mentality’ (ibidem).  
3.1.3 Standardization 
Interesting differences exist also between the standardization methods employed to normalize the 
sources. Since aggregate indices present the problem of reassembling data built up with different units 
of measure, or scale, one of the major challenges facing composite indices is that of rescaling the data 
from each source into a common unit. The WB adopts an Unobserved Component Model (UCM) 
(Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2007) in which corruption is approximated as a linear function of 
unobserved corruption g, in a country j, and a disturbance term .  
The compound of corruption is represented by this formula, used for all the six indicators of 
governance 
                   
where the observed score y of corruption (or any indicator of governance, k) in a country j , depends 
on the value of the unobserved corruption (or governance) g in country j, and a disturbance term  
(ibidem). The parameters  and  are essential to rescale the data from each source into common 
units. Data resulting from this standardization lie between - 2.5 to 2.5, and in percentile rank terms 
from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). 
The CPI, indeed, has employed until 2012 a two-step standardization model based on the 
techniques of matching percentiles and applying a beta-transformation, oriented to average together 
the percentile ranks of each country (Lambsdorff, 2007). The method of matching percentiles 
processes the ranks (and not the score) avoiding the introduction of new parameters: according to this 
method ‘the largest value in the CPI is taken as the standardized value for the country ranked best by 
the new source. The second largest value is given to the country ranked second best, etc.’ 
(ibidem:176). After this first process a simple mean and a second standardization was computed for 
increasing the standard deviation to the value of the previous year. The outcome of this standardization 
was comprised within the range from 0 to 10. 
Both methodologies have strengths and weaknesses: the UCM holds the advantage of maintaining 
some of the cardinal information in the underlying data (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010), while 
the method of matching percentiles wastes cardinal information essential to the formulation of 
comparative analyses (Lambsdorff, 2006). Since the CPI provides only the ordinal data and not the 
real value (score), the cross-country analysis is hampered by the lack of information about the real 
distance separating countries from each other, while the impossibility to transform the rank into a 
cardinal value hinders also the formulation of comparison from year to year. On the other hand, the 
UCM is weakened by the introduction of parameters based on a multitude of unrealistic assumptions
11
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(Lambsdorff, 2007), while the standardization carried out by TI shares the advantage of keeping the 
value within the range from 0 -10 without introducing unrealistic assumptions, but simply introducing 
the previous year’s CPI as standardized value.  
However, TI in 2012 undertook an important update in methodology oriented to mitigate these 
constraints. The latest CPI has been calculated using a simple average of standardized scores, 
represented by the formula 
           
       
               
where all the sources have been standardized by subtracting the mean of the data and dividing by the 
standard deviation (z-scores) and then readjusted to have a mean of 45 and standard deviation of 20 
(TI, 2012b). As result, data has been represented into a 0-100 scale (where a 0 equals the highest level 
of perceived corruption).  
3.1.4 Weighting 
Another important difference between CPI and CC concerns the weight attributed to each source in the 
aggregating process. TI attributes equal weight to all the sources composing the CPI, while the WB 
assumes that each source aggregated inside the CC holds an ‘unobservable’ value determined by the 
calculation of the error term: this method presupposes that sources which correlate better with the 
index are better than the other ones, hence ‘sources that provide a more informative signal of 
governance receive higher weight’ (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). More specifically, ‘the 
weights assigned to each source…are larger the smaller the variance of the error term of the source…’ 
(ibidem:12). While the choice made by TI can also be criticized, the method of weighting averages 
pursued by the WB has been subject to a major critique according to which the correlation between 
sources cannot be considered a serious proxy for accuracy (Knack, 2006). By assuming that the value 
expressed by the majority of sources can be ‘more informative,’ this approach ignores that the 
correlation between sources may be caused by the interdependence of judgments: as claimed by Arndt 
and Oman (2006) data provided by many of the sources employed both by TI and WB cannot be 
considered fully independent from the other sources. 
3.2 Major criticisms and answers 
Beyond the methodological pitfalls illustrated above, another important difference between the CPI 
and the WGI (CC) concerns the critiques and the attitude endorsed by WB and TI towards their own 
methodological or ontological constraints.  
3.2.1 Bandwagon effect 
The most important criticism advanced is related to the choice of relying on subjective data: in 
particular while some researchers (Treisman, 2007) have pointed out that perceptions do not measure 
corruption itself but only opinions about its incidence, others have lamented the fact that subjective 
assessments of corruption may be critically influenced by other factors and concerns.  
As summarized by Sequeira (2012), the first cognitive biases affecting the subjective measures of 
corruption is the bandwagon effect, which relates to the fact that perceptions of respondents tend to 
climb aboard the bandwagon of the common perceptions of corruption in a given country. According 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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to Andvig ‘this makes it almost impossible to determine whether the perception of increasing 
corruption levels worldwide is based on facts or not’ (Andvig et al., 2000). The bandwagon effect is 
particularly remarkable within the indices of state capacity, where the corruption measures rely 
directly on existing corruption indicators. The Control of Corruption, for instance, is one of the most 
widely used indicators of corruption within almost all the indices of state weakness: since the WB 
attributes higher weight to major correlated sources, the high correlation existing between governance 
perceptions rankings risk to perpetuate perception errors. 
3.2.2 Halo effect 
According to Sequeira, a second cognitive bias affects the subjective indicators of corruption: the halo 
effect concerns in fact the tendency to associate corruption with a lower standard of development 
(Sequeira, 2012). Several scholars have observed that the perception of corruption in less developed 
countries may be influenced by the development levels of each country. According to Glaeser, a 
correlation between governance ratings and levels of development exists, since there is an ontological 
interdependence between the perception of corruption and the ratings produced by business people or 
commercial risk rating agencies (Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004): corruption 
must be higher in underdeveloped countries, and lower in richest countries because the opinion of 
business people or academic experts may be influenced by the fact that low-developed, conflict prone 
societies are perceived as more corrupt. As pointed out by Treisman (2007:1), ‘countries that depend 
on fuel exports or have intrusive business regulations and unpredictable inflation are judged more 
corrupt’. However, even if higher development causes lower perceptions of corruption, controlling for 
income, ‘most factors that predict perceived corruption do not correlate with recently available 
measures of actual corruption experiences’ (ibidem). 
This bias particularly affects the CC, since the WGIs attribute major value to those commercial risk 
ratings that evidence greater correlations between them. While Kurtz and Shrank have argued that the 
halo effect may justify the high correlations existing between the Government Effectiveness 
indicator
12
 and growth rate (Kurtz & Schrank, 2008), Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006, 2007) 
have rejected these criticisms by arguing that there is no robust empirical base supporting this concern. 
However, other scholars have recently reinforced this point affirming that measures of actual 
corruption experiences do not correlate with any of these development factors once one controls for 
income (Treisman, 2007).  
3.2.3 Comparative deficit 
Thirdly, both CPI and CC are not readily used for cross-country comparison, or for measurement over 
time. Generally, all the indicators are based on a rank-order structure oriented to enable comparisons. 
However, the ordinal character allows us to make only biased comparisons. Since the position of each 
country is determined by the position of the others scored in the index, the cross-county comparison is 
based more on indexation rather than on an appropriate quantification, or approximation, of the level 
of corruption. The Control of Corruption, for instance, suffers a serious longitudinal deficit because 
the measures provided by the WB are not informative about trends in global averages: the ranking and 
the data sources are not comparable form one year to year, since the composition of the sample 
substantially changes over years (Andvig et al., 2000). The CPI indeed, is a relative index of 
corruption at a point in time that has never been oriented to capture changes in perceptions of 
corruption on a country level. Until 2012, in fact, the CPI did not allow us to make comparisons of 
corruption over time: data were aggregated on the basis of the relative position held by each country in 
comparison to other countries and the standardized procedure was elaborate on the computation of a 
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simple mean and standard deviation representing each previous year (TI, 2012a). However, the 
updated methodology has introduced an important reorientation, driving the CPI towards a different 
perspective: data from each of the data sources have been aggregated including just one year’s data 
from each data source. As a consequence, the longitudinal reliability of the index has been improved 
(TI, 2012a) and ‘any change from year to year in the raw scores will therefore be translated into a 
change in the rescaled score from that data source’ (ibidem: 2).  
3.2.4 WB’s and TI’s attitude towards change  
Although both the World Bank and Transparency International have formally recognized the utility of 
debating conceptual and methodological constraints related to the construction of indicators of 
governance, only TI has adopted consistent methodological changes. While in 2012 TI has introduced 
an important update related to the aggregation formula, the WB has not undertaken similar consistent 
changes. The World Bank has rejected most of the important criticisms raised by Arndt and Oman 
(2006), Knack (2006), Kurtz and Shrank (2008) labeling them as either ‘conceptually incorrect or 
empirically unsubstantiated’, biased interpretations, a priori grounds, entirely lacking in empirical 
support, or simply irrelevant (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007). Table 3 summarizes and 
compares the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Control of Corruption measure (CC/WGI). 
  




Table 3. Comparative analysis between CPI and CC/WGI.  
 Control of Corruption (WGI, 2012) Corruption Perception Index (CPI, 2012) 
Definition Corruption is ‘the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of 
the state by elites and private interests’. (WGI, 2013) 
‘Corruption is the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain. It hurts everyone 
who depends on the integrity of people in 
a position of authority’. (TI, 2013) 
Purpose Assessing a measure of governance originally 
devoted to create cross-country indicators of 
governance and to establish more effective 
instruments of government assistance. (The World 
Bank, 2007) 
Raising public awareness of corruption; 
providing ‘data on extensive perceptions of 
corruption within countries’ (Lambsdorff, 
2007) 
Data sources 31: 
- Survey of firms and households (Afro-barometer; 
Business Enterprise Environment Survey; 
Transparency International Global Corruption 
Barometer; World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report; Gallup World Poll; Latino-
barometro; Political Economic Risk Consultancy 
Corruption in Asia; Vanderbilt University Americas 
Barometer; Institute for Management and 
Development World Competitiveness Yearbook); 
- Commercial business information (Economist 
Intelligence Unit Risk-wire & Democracy Index, iJET 
Country Security Risk Ratings, Political Risk Services, 
Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk 
Indicators); 
- NGO (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Freedom 
House Countries at the Crossroads, Freedom House, 
Global Integrity Index, Heritage Foundation Index of 
Economic Freedom, African Electoral Index, 
International Research and Exchanges Board Media 
Sustainability Index, International Budget Project 
Open Budget Index, Reporters Without Borders 
Press Freedom Index);  
- GOV (African Development Bank Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessments, Asian Development 
Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments; 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
Transition Report; Cingranelli Richards Human Rights 
Database and Political Terror Scale; IFAD Rural 
Sector Performance Assessments; Institutional 
Profiles Database; World Bank Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessments; US State Department 
Trafficking in People report); 
13: 
- NGO (Bertelsmann Foundation 
Sustainable Governance Indicators; 
Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation 
Index; Freedom House Nations in Transit; 
Global Insight Country Risk Ratings; 
Transparency International Bribe Payers 
Survey); 
- Business executives (African 
Development Bank Governance Ratings; 
IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook; 
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy 
Asian Intelligence; Political Risk Services 
International Country Risk Guide; World 
Bank Country Performance and 
Institutional Assessment; Economist 







Unobserved Component Model  Matching percentile and beta-
transformation (1995-2011) 
Average of standardized scores (2012) 
Weighting Weighted average Simple average 
Criticisms Halo effect; 
Bandwagon effect (Seqeira, 2012); 
Comparative deficit; 
Introduction of parameters based on unrealistic 
assumptions (Lambsdorff, 2007);  
Reluctant attitude towards methodological changes 
Bandwagon effect (Seqeira, 2012) 
Waste of cardinal information; 
Comparative deficit 




4. The use of corruption indicators and policy implications  
From the literature examined above a concern emerges about the consequences of the proliferation of 
indicators for anti-corruption policies; but few efforts have been made to approach indicators as part of 
the rhetoric of the contemporary political order. Indicators support the creation of new modes of 
governance, generating expectations and policy directions. But what drives the demand for indicators? 
Before evaluating possible normative and policy implications of corruption measures (4.2), this 
paragraph evaluates possible driving forces for the demand for indicators (4.1). 
4.1 Demands for corruption indicators 
The production of indicators of corruption is driven by different normative prescriptions and policy 
demands. The demand for corruption indicators seems to be closely linked to the promotion of anti-
corruption strategies considered crucial for the establishment and consolidation of new or simply good 
governance practices. Key actors endorse these strategies: international institutions (World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, OECD, UNDP), transnational partnerships (US’s Foreign Corrupt 
Practice Act, (FCPA)), development agencies, national governments and non-governmental 
organizations (Transparency International, Mo Ibrahim Foundation). All these actors are interested in 
curbing corruption and promoting good governance. Five key actors must be taken into special 
consideration here. 
The World Bank’s demand for corruption indicators is oriented to build instruments for reducing 
the economic incentives for engaging in corruption, and simulating reforms encouraging neo-liberal 
policies targeted to increase the economic liberalization, to reduce discretion and to increase 
accountability (The World Bank, 2000). Reducing corruption is understood as essential to enhancing 
the effectiveness of development aid in Bank borrowers (Chase, 2002: 20).  
Transparency International’s demand for fighting corruption, indeed, is oriented to developing 
‘participative’ good governance policies: even if in close collaboration with government and 
international organizations, such us the WB and IMF, TI attempts to promote participation of the 
society and assisting civil society in combating corruption. 
The OECD’s demand for corruption indicators is based not only on the willingness of 
industrialized nations to elaborate instruments for detecting member states’ compliance with anti-
corruption norms, but also on the need to better target foreign investment in developing countries. As 
clearly pointed out by Katseli (Arndt & Oman, 2006: 9) 
For investors, as the OECD’s Business and Industry Advisory Committee recently noted, the 
quality of governance has become the single most important determinant of investment-location 
decisions in developing and emerging market economies… Foreign direct investment going to 
those countries, whether to create or acquire production capacities to serve local markets, or to 
serve global markets or the investors’ home markets, has grown from an average annual net inflow 
of about $10 billion in the early 1980s, to over $67 billion in 1992-94 and over $150 billion since 
1997. 
The European Union’s demand for corruption indicators is aiming to prevent and fight political 
corruption by the means of law enforcement, judicial and police cooperation between EU member 
states. The EU has adopted a wider set of measures to address the risk associated with corruption 
where both new and old modes of governance
13
 have been pursued. On the one side, the ratification of 
the Stockholm treaty has given to the European Commission the official mandate to actively develop a 
European anti-corruption policy, comprehending both forensic financial analysis and the adoption of 
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the available instruments in fiscal, civil and criminal law. On the other side, the Stockholm treaty 
identifies some of the guidelines for the emergence of a new mode of governance by addressing the 
necessity of developing indicators ‘to measure efforts in the fight against corruption, in particular in 
the areas of the acquis (public procurement, financial control, etc.)’ (European Commission, 2011). 
The production of indicators, in fact, has been conceptualized as part ‘of the social agenda in the 
European Union’ and instrument of the EU policy for ‘promoting social inclusion’ (Rose-Ackerman, 
1999). In June 2011, the European Commission authorized the creation an annual EU anti-corruption 
report for the periodic assessment of EU member states’ efforts in the fight against corruption. 
4.2 Policy implications 
Once the demands for corruption indicators have been identified, what kind of consequences do the 
indicators have? Are the anti-corruption strategies sensitive to the choice of the measure of corruption? 
How do indicators influence the understanding of corruption, its causes and effects? How do 
indicators influence decisions on interventions? Although it may be too soon to answer these questions 
with any certainty, some observations may be advanced. Several kinds of consequences can be 
identified on the level of corruption (4.2.1), the general discourse about global governance (4.2.2), the 
formulation of regulatory interventions (4.2.3).  
4.2.1 Level of corruption 
The high level of attention corruption attracts today may be considered a good indicator of the 
influence exercised by the growing sophistication in measures of corruption. Policy-makers may be 
attracted to indicators of corruption because of the seemingly transparent and scientific nature of the 
indicator. The activity of ranking appears to have generated strong incentives towards policy reforms 
and monitoring the country level of corruption. However, year to year changes in the value of 
corruption in one country may not be determined by a change in the performance of the country’s 
attitude towards corruption; a country could achieve a better (worse) position just because new 
countries may be included (excluded) in the index, or because other countries would be able to 
perform better (worse). As pointed out by Arndt and Oman (2006: 41) ‘While Transparency 
International clearly asserts that the CPI is a ranking and cannot be used as a measure of national 
performance in the fight against corruption (Sampford, 2006), it is often (mis)interpreted by 
newspapers, and sometimes (mis)used by donors, as precisely such a measure’. As result, the ranking 
activity has tended to create a ranking paradox: especially subjective indicators have become suitable 
substitutes for corruption (Cooley, 2013) and ‘countries are perceived as less or more corrupt than they 
actually are’ (Søreide, 2006: 21).  
4.2.2 Impact on global governance discourse 
Corruption indicators exert an important impact on framing the general discourse about global 
governance. In order to understand this influence, three factors must be taken into consideration. From 
an analytical perspective, although the empirical evidence suggests that corruption may not be entirely 
explained by factors such as democratic institutions or well established levels of economic growth
14
, 
the activity of ranking has been anchored in the vision of corruption as a deviation from the formal and 
legal-rational model of state. For instance, indicators of corruption in developing countries do not take 
into consideration the divergences existing between de jure and de facto regulations: indicators which 
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assess the existence of legal instruments able to enforce anti-corruption policies often do not 
correspond to the historical processes leading the state to enforce legitimate and credible anti-
corruption campaigns. Quite the contrary, the legal instruments taken into consideration often 
correspond to the legislative measures belonging to the European administrations imposed during the 
colonial era, and inherited by the post-colonial states. For instance, even if in many countries it is 
formally illegal for a public official to accept a bribe, little correlation exists between de facto 
experience with corruption and formal regulations: the perception of bribery changes across countries, 
and the level of de jure corruption rarely corresponds to the level of measured de facto corruption. As 
confirmed by Hallward, in many African countries the firms’ actual experiences with the regulatory 
environment does not correspond to the formal regulations to which they are subject to (Hallward-
Driemeier, Khun-Jush, & Pritchett, 2010). As a result, indicators of corruption may actually measure 
the idea of corruption transferred by the colonial powers to the emerging post-colonial countries.  
Second, policy-makers may instrumentally use indicators for explanatory aims, often creating 
hazardous cause-effect relationships. Hence, the original mandate of describing and monitoring 
corruption by the means of indicators has been turned into an inappropriate explanatory enterprise: 
when indicators are employed to describe standards and evaluate performances, the social complexity 
simplified behind the indicators is not spelled out. Therefore, the numerical representation of social 
phenomena suffers a loss of information that may be accepted for limited descriptive purposes, but 
which make it almost impossible to attribute any explanatory aim to the production of indicators.  
Third, governance indicators have been employed within the recent indices of state weakness to 
construct broader indicators: for instance, within the Index of State Weakness the indicator of 
corruption provided by the WB (Control of Corruption) has been employed as one of the components 
of the ‘political basket of indicators’ (Rice and Patrick, 2008). But looking at the composition of the 
entire index, a selection bias emerges: the set of indicators employed as proxies for the political 
indicators - Government effectiveness, the Rule of law, Voice and accountability, and Control of 
corruption- belong almost entirely to the Worldwide Governance Indicator Project; only Freedom 
Ratings, are generated by a different organization, the Freedom House. Although aggregate indicators 
should aim to measure relevant phenomena from a number of different data sources, the choice of 
relying exclusively on World Bank data undermines the rationale of plurality lying behind the 
aggregation methodology. So far, this approach implies an oversimplification according to which state 
weakness may be computed relying solely on governance indicators, gradually inducing the policy-
makers to associate the concept of governance with the concept of state.  
4.2.3 Universalistic Regulatory Interventions 
Corruption indicators exert an important impact not only on understanding and framing the problem of 
corruption, but also on formulating policy responses and setting strategic agendas. One of the most 
controversial implications of the proliferation of rankings concerns the reproduction of new 
developmental categories and capacity thresholds indispensable to justify universal regulatory 
interventions, rather than monitoring phenomena that may or may not require intervention. Aid 
agencies and international investors, in fact, have been interested in using indicators as technologies of 
governance and imposing political and economic conditionality or demonstrating the positive effects 
of the regulatory interventions undertaken.  
Although the debate on corruption has been associated with the necessity of creating new modes of 
governance, understood as post-regulatory instruments, corruption indicators have remained critically 
anchored in the ‘top-down’ problem-solving approach. From a regulatory perspective, policy-makers 
and stakeholders have attempted to approach anti-corruption efforts by focusing on institutional and 
economic adjustments promoting universalistic standards of governance, rather than addressing more 
in depth analysis capable of privileging the formulation of local solutions to local problems. 




Corruption indicators, in fact, have only theoretically stimulated the formulation of post-regulatory 
instruments oriented to promote non-state or ‘new’ modes of governance. Public authority remains 
still the principal actor and focus within anti-corruption strategies.
 
One of the major criticisms of the 
anti-corruption strategies articulated by Mungiu-Pippidi:  
Most studies of corruption, especially those written by economists, adopt a “principal-agent” 
approach: They postulate the existence at all times of a well-meaning “principal” whose trust is 
abused by some “agent” and in whose interest is to fight corruption. Thus assistance for good-
governance programs usually is directed toward such principals (ministries, control agencies, and 
anticorruption bodies), which are assumed to be morally above corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2013:102). 
The claim is that such a focus on state actors and reform of state policy overlooks the role of collective 
action and civil society in generating the conditions for effective control of elite corruption. Do 
corruption indicators, with their tendency to reduce corruption to governance-related definitions and 
institutional quality dimensions, reinforce this policy bias? 
5. Conclusion 
Defining what kind of legal and policy response has been elaborated to deal with the image of 
corruption framed by the modern measures is hard to establish. Although the literature has provided 
interesting reading about the impact of corruption on both developed and developing countries, the 
impact of corruption indicators on policy-making is nevertheless perceivable, and has received less 
scrutiny (Davis & Kingsbury, 2011). The aim of this paper is to identify a set of questions crucial to 
understand to what extent the methodological and conceptual problems associated with the existing 
measures of corruption may have an impact on the way policy-makers use these indicators. 
5.1 Epistemological questions 
On the conceptual side, measures of corruption have been subject to a theoretical fragmentation that 
has hampered the possibility of creating comprehensive measures able to capture the complexity of 
this phenomenon. But to what extent has the formulation of partial definitions been essential to 
measure ‘what can be counted’ about corruption, rather than other dimensions of the phenomenon? 
Definitions of corruption differ widely according to the actors (bureaucrats, politicians and 
administrations), the size (grand and petty) and the kind of sectors involved (private and public). Why 
do the indicator creators disagree about the equal recognition of corruption in the private and publics 
sector? For instance, why does TI conceptualize active bribery as a sub-category of corruption while 
the WB and other providers apply the term corruption to both the activities of ‘accepting or giving a 
bribe’? 
Second, important questions have arisen from the interaction between the activity of ranking state 
capacity and rating governance performances. What is the causal relationship between corruption and 
state fragility? Does corruption foment the weakness of state apparatus, or conversely, is it state 
fragility that motivates politicians and public servants to get involved in abuse of power for private 
gain?  
5.2 Methodological questions 
On the methodological side, other fundamental questions have emerged. Considering the weighting 
systems adopted by WB and TI, does the average weighting method (WB) encourage perception errors 
given the possibility that different surveys rely on each other’s assessments? Conversely, given the 
disparity of information provided by different sources does the weighting system (TI) risk to assign 




equal value to different sources? To what extent does the weighting system overestimate or 
underestimate the importance attributed to each data source?  
Can corruption be computed as a linear function without taking into consideration income, 
government policies, legal system, natural resources, or colonial experience? To what extent are the 
assumptions indispensable for the formulation of the UCM realistic? 
5.3 Ontological questions 
Considering that different countries hold different perceptions, experiences and definitions of 
corruption, to what extent can this diverse and multidimensional reality be meaningfully captured by 
indicator? Do existing indicators stimulate local communities to engage in collective action against 
corrupt practices? What are the consequences of the ways in which the concept of corruption is framed 
and iterated through various measures, for the perception and subsequent measurement of corruption? 
This paper has raised more questions than it can answer. The development of corruption indicators 
is a dynamic process, constantly influenced by emerging normative and policy demands. Bracketing 
the question of whether these indicators are satisfactory or effective for formulating policy 
recommendations, this paper has attempted to investigate which kind of discursive elements, 
normative demands and policy implications might be anchored in the formulation of corruption 
indicators.   
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